Schweinfurt
Was pushed from all sides, the German strategic industry into the K.O. - impact to shift. From the US Air Force pressure came to prove that the strategy of the mass attack was the correct one. To it it came that the Meteoroligists had predicted clear view for Central Europe, for which next day however already again on one at least two weeks continuing bad weather phase counted.
The bomber forces their waiting loop divided for Regensburg flew a whole hour, and each movement of each airplane was pursued exactly by the German radio operators on the radar display screen. From the airfields in Holland and Northern Germany interceptors ascended, and also they began an aimless, lonely shade dance, like a boxer in its corner, before the gong sounds to the next round. The Typhoons and Mitchells started to its useless provocation maneuvers over the road of Dover. And general Anderson one hesitated still. At 10.00 o'clock was obligatorily removed from it the decision. If the Regensburg formation should reach the unknown combat air bases in Africa still with sufficient daylight, he had to now loose-fly.
The teleprinters in the control towers in east England began to tick, and the 3rd Division of US 8th Air Force started toward the east.
The fog began itself to clear now also further in the south and in the inland, where the relays beorderten to pig ford waited for the start. Further delays developed, while a relay joined after the other one the waiting loop. About at the airplane swarm turned 01.15 hours pm to the south off, over the coast of Suffolk, over the North Sea and beyond the borders of any reason, into another world. The majority of the second attack wave did not even see the corner of a protecting hunter, after the Dutch coast was overflown. Spitfires of the Royal air Force welcomed it, but the long-distance - Thunderbolts were started 9 minutes too late and did not catch up them.
"Within fewer minutes it was no longer heavy to differentiate between friend and enemy because were only enemy airplanes to see"
A Gunner
One whispers that general Anderson one of the opinion was, if a ten minute delay were sufficient, in order to donate in the numbers of the Air Force confusion it with a delay of 3 hours just as well would work. The ability German radar - warning system to underestimate in such a manner was almost criminal. While a distance of 10 minutes between the two groups of attacks would have forced the German air defense to divide their task forces it had sufficiently refuelled now sufficient time, their entire defense, and had armed, first first to afterwards then against-throw to the following group.